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Abstract
We investigate cooperative behavior within technology regions in
patenting activities. Case studies of local innovation systems point out
certain characteristics fruitful to innovation and regional growth but
often pronounce historical singularities as major inﬂuence. We pro-
vide evidence on the same theoretical basis in an econometric study.
Based on a theoretical discussion of research cooperation hypotheses
are derived which relate a regions technological characteristics to that
regions account of research cooperation. Patent data are used to de-
ﬁne the technological specialization of German regions and identify
cooperations within and between them. Most cooperations tend to
take place in modestly specialized regions, indicating a need for simi-
lar technological capabilities between partner ﬁrms.
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11 Introduction
Scholars of the economics of innovation and technological change largely agree
on innovation as an interactive and highly systemic process with many actors
from diﬀerent parts of the economy involved (e.g. Nelson 1993, Lundvall
1992). The density of innovation networks as well as the openness towards
external knowledge of the relevant actors, amongst other factors, have been
identiﬁed as necessary conditions for the performance of local innovation
systems (Breschi and Malerba 2001).
In this paper we focus on the technological knowledge of a region and the
patterns of cooperative behavior of the actors within that region as a means
of transferring this knowledge. Of course there are many ways by which in-
formation between economic actors may be exchanged, one of the empirically
more traceable is the formal R&D cooperation. The theoretical literature on
R&D cooperation has largely focused on the social beneﬁts of R&D cooper-
ations as a means of internalizing positive spillovers generated through R&D
(e.g. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992).
Since the ﬁrms in those models are symmetric with respect to their tech-
nological capabilities, cooperation and its consequences is solely dependent
on diﬀerent product market and spillover conditions. These conditions are
not questioned here, rather it is assumed that cooperation is favorable to
innovation. Taking a step back from that discussion we rather investigate
ﬁrms decision to cooperate or not when they are technologically heteroge-
neous and how this relates to a quite similar pattern of cooperative activities
on a regional level.
The main research question within this paper is concerned with the re-
lationship between the knowledge and/or the degree of specialization within
a region, its propensity to cooperate and the kind or pattern of this rela-
tionship. In particular we are interested wether the kind and level of so-
phistication of technologies applied in a region, the technological diversity of
that region as well as the relative technological position of that region with
respect to other regions have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the intensity and kind
2of cooperative behavior in research of the ﬁrms within a region.
The major results of our analysis are as follows: First, we ﬁnd that re-
gions which are technologically not too specialized show the highest number
of research cooperations. Second, the higher a regions technological special-
ization the more cooperation will take place with partners inside the same
region compared to cooperation with partners outside that region. Third,
technologically more diverse regions show more internal cooperations whereas
for regions which are less diverse we ﬁnd a higher number of external coop-
eration.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, in section 2 we present the theo-
retical background for the hypotheses we want to test empirically. Here we
introduce the conceptions of technology gap, technological diversity, of inter-
nal and external cooperations, and the tech-region as main building-blocs.
Section 3 is devoted to the description of our database and the construc-
tion of the various variables we use. Section 4 reports on our estimation
results gives appropriate interpretations. Section 5 concludes the paper by
summarizing and pointing on further research required.
2 Theoretical Background and Derivation of
Hypotheses
In order to develop testable hypotheses on the speciﬁc regional pattern of
ﬁrms cooperative behavior in this section we present the theoretical back-
ground. In particular, we ﬁrst aim at the knowledge based incentives of
ﬁrms for engaging in the exchange of know-how on a cooperative basis. In a
second step we extend the arguments on the ﬁrm level to the regional level.
In a third step we derive from this three hypotheses on the relationship be-
tween a region’s technological characteristics and the pattern of its ﬁrms
cooperating in research.
32.1 Collective invention
Theories on innovation networks, such as local innovation systems or techno-
logical systems, tell us that quite regularly new know-how is to be considered
as the collective rather than an individual outcome of knowledge generating
activities. This collective dimension is based on the conscious (and some-
times unconscious) exchange of information and knowledge between speciﬁc
actors which diﬀer in the kind of knowledge and capabilities they hold and
master as well as in the level of their respective technological competence.
Knowledge exchange taking place among such heterogeneous agents may lead
to a new combination or recombination of speciﬁc knowledge and competen-
cies which then via so-called cross-fertilization leads to new know-how and
new capabilities. Consequently, the resulting achievements are a collective
outcome and had not been possible by the knowledge generating activities of
a single isolated actor.
2.2 Local innovation systems and technology systems
Whenever this exchange of knowledge is taking place on more frequent and
even regular terms, whether formalized or not (von Hippel 1987), the result-
ing structure of relationships can be described by a system or network of ac-
tors. Those systems reduce the cost of exchanging know-how and information
and thus let the beneﬁts of cross-fertilization be reaped more easily. Based on
this aspect, networks for know-how exchange can be observed on diﬀerent lev-
els. Whenever geographical proximity enables and eases know-how exchange,
a regional or local system of innovation (Saxenian 1994, Cooke 1998) may
show up (e.g. Jena, where a number of diﬀerent technologies co-exist such
as optics, biotechnology etc.). Is the ease of knowledge exchange directly re-
lated to proximity in technological know-how, so-called technological systems
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991) may be observed which are characterized by
a nevertheless broadly deﬁned core technology (such as ”automobiles” where
a small number of sub-technologies such as combustion engines, electronics,
4safety-technologies etc. come together). Of course, ﬁrms can be ”member”
of both kinds of systems.
2.3 Know-how exchange and technology structure
So far, classifying network based exchange of know-how has been based on the
degree of accessibility and the related transaction costs. In addition to that,
and maybe even more important than sheer (cost dependent) accessibility is
the degree to which exchange of knowledge is beneﬁcial to both or all sides
involved. As mentioned above the knowledge a ﬁrm is endowed with at a
certain point in time has at least two dimensions, the kind of knowledge on
the one side and its level or degree of sophistication on the other side. For
any two (or more) actors willing to exchange know-how these two aspects
are of importance.
Consider ﬁrst that the speciﬁc kinds of knowledge are substitutive instead
of complementary. Consequently, the actors will not get into exchanging
know-how. Alternatively, considering the case where the speciﬁc knowledge
endowments are neither substitutable nor complementary exchange of know-
how will not beneﬁt any of the parties. Third, of course, with complementary
knowledge know-how exchange is likely to beneﬁt all actors involved.
With respect to the level of knowledge consider actors whose knowledge
by all means is complimentary but who diﬀer considerably in the level of
technological sophistication, that is there are high-tech actors as well as low-
tech actors. In such cases the diﬀerence in just these technology levels, the so-
called technological gap1, may determine whether a cooperation is beneﬁcial
for all exchanging parties. For two actors which are rather diﬀerent, the
technological gap between both is relatively large, and therefore the exchange
of know-how may be beneﬁcial for the technological laggard only. In that
1The technology gap here is to be considered as a multidimensional conception when
diﬀerent knowledge components make up the technology level of an actor. An appropriate
measure should take account of diﬀerences in technological levels in the aggregate.
5Figure 1: Probability of cooperation depending on the technological gap
between two ﬁrms.
case an exchange of know-how or a cooperation will not be established2.
Alternatively, when the technological gap between two actors is rather low
the exchange of know-how is beneﬁcial to both, in which case a know-how
exchange or cooperation is likely to become established.
This idea is graphically represented in ﬁgure 1 where the probability of a
cooperation between two ﬁrms A and B is highest for a technological gap of
zero while the probability declines with the diﬀerence in the level of capabil-
ities. Note that this holds for complimentary knowledge only.
Related to this dependence of cooperation on technology gap structures
is that technologically highly sophisticated ﬁrms might even be unable to
ﬁnd appropriate cooperation partners. Take, for example, the only and far
2We abstract from the possibility of ﬁnancial compensation for the technological leader.
Even though we see cooperations between for example newly founded biotechnology ﬁrms
(the leader) with large pharmaceutical companies (the laggard) where this compensation
is practiced to the extreme case of a merger.
6ahead technology leader in a certain sector for whom the likelihood to ﬁnd a
partner is relatively low - in the case of a monopolistic situation even zero. In
addition to these last arguments one might also ask whether high-tech ﬁrms
or rather low-tech actors are more interested or engaged in cooperation. On
the assumption that low-tech know-how usually has diﬀused already and
thus is public, it is high-tech knowledge which is supposed to be less easily
accessible and will be only exchanged (and thus diﬀuses) in an cooperative
arrangement. Consequently, high tech-ﬁrms tend to be more engaged in
cooperation than low-tech actors.
2.4 Cooperation and relative technological position
Based on these arguments we want to establish the following: Assume that
the actors considered are never identical with respect to their kind of knowl-
edge and speciﬁc capabilities. Assume also that the actors attempting to
exchange know-how face all the same transaction costs in getting access to
other know-how or using the network. The engagement of these actors in
cooperation and know-how exchange then depends on their respective tech-
nological position within the overall technology structure resulting from the
speciﬁc knowledge endowments of the heterogeneous actors. The techno-
logical position is deﬁned in a relative way, as an actor’s technological gap
towards other actors (lagging or leading) as well as the degree of complemen-
tarity of the speciﬁc knowledge endowments (complementary, substitutive or
non-related).
2.5 Regional focus and tech-regions
Before we derive hypotheses that can be tested empirically we want to switch
the perspective and consider the actors as part of certain geographical region.
In order to take into account the various technologies performed in a certain
region we deﬁne so-called tech-regions. A tech-region ij consists of the ﬁrms
located in region i and engaged in technology class j. For example the optic
7ﬁrms Zeiss and Jenoptik belong to the technology class ”optics” and are
located in the region of ”Jena”. This tech-region is potentially part of the
local innovation system of Jena as well as potentially part of the technological
system of the optics industry in Germany (or even world wide).
Looking at a speciﬁc tech-region ij one may be interested in the follow-
ing questions: (a) Are ﬁrms belonging to tech-region ij engaged in know-how
exchange or research cooperation? (b) If there is cooperation to be observed
for tech-region ij, what are the determinants for such cooperative arrange-
ments on the tech-regional, regional, and technological level? (c) What kind
of network-relationships or know-how exchange relationships are the ﬁrms
engaged in? That is, whether they are integrated in a local system of inno-
vation and/or in a technological system. In the former case the cooperation
is called internal to the region, in the latter case we have cooperation which
is external to the region.
In order to argue on the level of tech-regions the above used concepts of
technology gap and kind of technology have to be adjusted. For the former,
we use the degree of technological specialization of a region i in technology j.
The higher this degree the more specialized is region i in generating new tech-
nological know-how and the higher the level of technological sophistication
in technology j. For the latter, the degree of technological diversity describes
an upper boundary for possible technological complementarities faced by the
actors within region i.
2.6 Hypotheses
On the basis of this regional perspective we can formulate hypotheses about
the cooperative endeavors of ﬁrms:
Hypothesis 1 Comparing diﬀerent tech-regions the number of cooperations
is highest for some intermediate degree of specialization.
This hypothesis follows directly from the idea that as long two actors
have complementary knowledge the technological gap must not be too large
8for them to both beneﬁt by cooperating.
Hypothesis 2 If ﬁrms located within one speciﬁc tech-region are assumed to
be rather similar in technological level, tech-regions which are more special-
ized will show a higher number of internal cooperations relative to external
cooperations.
A tech-region being highly specialized implies that the knowledge gener-
ated therein makes up a large quantity of the new knowledge of the whole
technological system. The probability of ﬁnding an appropriate partner for
mutual beneﬁcial knowledge exchange within the region rises compared to
ﬁnding one outside.
For a third hypothesis consider the following. Firms have closer contacts
to other ﬁrms belonging to the same local or technological innovation sys-
tem than to ﬁrms outside either system. Those existing contacts provide
a breeding-ground for cooperations. On the one hand, diversity of the re-
gion provides easily accessible knowledge for diversifying or broadening ﬁrms
knowledge bases. On the other hand, speciﬁc knowledge to the own ﬁeld
might rather be found within the technological system. We can now state:
Hypothesis 3 Tech-regions within technologically more diverse regions show
a higher level of internal cooperations, while those within less diverse regions
cooperate more external to their location.
3 Data
3.1 Patent level
For the empirical analysis we use German patent data as provided by the
German patent oﬃce3. The Patents in the database were disclosed between
1995 and 2001 and were assigned by at least one assignee located in Germany.
3(Patosr 2001)
9We use information about the assignee(s), the inventor(s), and the IPC main
classiﬁcation of each patent.
Each patent is characterized according to its cooperative nature, tech-
nological class, location, and if one of the assignees is a university or other
public research institution. A patent is considered a cooperation if the num-
ber of assignees is greater than one (co-assigned). In our view this assumption
leads to an underestimation rather than an overestimation of cooperations.
Since two organizations that decide to assign a patent together will have to
had cooperated on that project and on the other hand, not every research
cooperation will lead to a co-assigned patent if the partners ﬁnd other ways
to compensate each other.
A co-assigned patent is counted as an internal cooperation if it is a cooper-
ation in the sense above and all inventors are located in the same region, an
external cooperation is a cooperation where at least two of the inventors are
not co-located. The reason for this calculation lies in the patenting conven-
tions of large organizations. Big ﬁrms (e.g. Siemens) or research institutes
like Max-Planck or Fraunhofer assign their patents in their headquarters no
matter where the research leading to the patent was conducted. Therefore
cooperations between such large patentees and smaller ones in other regions
will almost always be counted as external cooperations even if they were
actually within a region. In our sample 12,889 of the 237,431 patents are
considered as cooperations with 3,282 internal and 9,607 external to the re-
gion.
3.2 Technology region level
Since our level of analysis is the tech-region, we aggregate the variables to the
level of the technological region.4 For the technological aggregation patents
have been classiﬁed according to a technology-oriented classiﬁcation that
distinguishes 5 industries and 30 technologies based on the International
4e.g. KO in the new dataset is the sum of KO on patent level for technology j in
region i.
10Patent classiﬁcation (IPC). This classiﬁcation has been elaborated jointly by
the Fraunhofer-Institut f¨ ur Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (FhG-
ISI), the Observatoire de Sciences et des Techniques (OST), and the Science
and Technology Research Policy Unit of the University of Sussex (SPRU).
Its most updated version is reported in table 5. The observation unit is
then a technological class located in a postal region, according to the ﬁrst
three digits of the German postal code, of the ﬁrst assignee mentioned on the
patent. Resulting from this procedure we end up with 14867 observations
consisting of 675 regions and 30 technological ﬁelds.5
To characterize the tech-regions several variables as presented in table 1
are used. We measure or approximate the regional competence in a certain
technology by the degree of specialization of that tech-region. We presume,
that in the long run a region will not follow a technological path if it is not suc-
cessful in those technologies and therefore assume technological competence
and specialization to be positively correlated. We follow Patel and Pavitt
(1991) and Soete (1981) by employing the index of Technological Revealed
Comparative Advantage (TRCA), originally used in a moderately diﬀerent
form in trade theory6. This specialization index uses the number of patents
(Pij) of region i in technology ﬁeld j and is deﬁned as a regions share of all









A value above unity indicates a comparative advantage of region i in the
technological ﬁeld j.7 Our expectations about the coeﬃcients of this variable
are discussed at length in section 2.
5Of course not all regions patent in all technological ﬁelds.
6Namely Balassa’s (1965) Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage.




j Pij ,∀i). If all patents from one region are in one technological class Pij =
P
j Pij
and therefore cancel out.
11The role of diversity in cities or regions has been discussed in the liter-
ature. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992) test three diﬀerent
models of knowledge spillovers according to their impact on the growth rate
of cities. They ﬁnd clear evidence in favor of the model by Jacobs (1969)
where she argues that the most important sources of knowledge spillovers
are external to the industry in which the ﬁrm operates and that cities are
the source of innovation because diversity is greatest in cities. We therefore
include a simple measure of diversiﬁcation of the region. Duranton and Puga
(2000) applied the inverse of a Hirshman-Herﬁndahl index, which translates
for our purposes to summing the square of each sector’s share in local patents
for each region over all technologies. Formally the Hirshman-Herﬁndahl in-







where pij is the patent share of technology j in region i.
If patenting activity in the region under consideration is fully concen-
trated in a technology, we ﬁnd DI = 1, and this index increases as activities
in this region become more diverse. A positive coeﬃcient of diversity would
speak in favor of Jacobs’s (1969) argument.
To account for diﬀerences between tech-regions in terms of the concentra-
tion of patentees we also calculated the Herﬁndahl Index for every observation









Pk is the number of patents assigned by organization k in tech-region
ij. The expected impact of the concentration of patentees on the number of
internal cooperations is clear. In the extreme case of a single inventor of the
tech-region there is no possibility of internal cooperation, so the inﬂuence
should be negative. For the number of external cooperations this coeﬃcient
should be positive if we assume that the ”monopolist inventor” searches for
external partners if he does not ﬁnd them locally.










The ideal type local innovation system is specialized in a technology which
is geographically concentrated with many local innovators. We should there-
fore see more internal cooperations in those concentrated technologies, while
for external cooperations there could be two eﬀects, pushing into diﬀerent
directions. If the technological system is dense, external cooperations could
be expected to rise with concentration. On the other hand in the extreme
case of a single innovating region in that technology we can - by deﬁnition -
observe no external cooperation.
With those variables at hand we proceed with the regressions and their
analysis in the following section.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we present the empirical test of the hypotheses presented in
section 2. The theoretical considerations predict that between tech-regions
the number of cooperations is highest for some intermediate degree of spe-
cialization. Firms within a less specialized region lack the know-how to be
a partner for other ﬁrms and when they are too specialized they have dif-
ﬁculties ﬁnding a partner from whom to beneﬁt through cooperation. It is
analyzed if there are any diﬀerences between factors inﬂuencing internal and
external cooperations. If ﬁrms located within one speciﬁc tech-region are as-
sumed to be rather homogeneous, in terms of level of know-how, our model
predicts a higher number of cooperations within tech-regions (internal coop-
erations) which are more specialized. This relationship can not be expected
when analyzing external cooperations. Strongly specialized, as well as not
specialized tech-regions should show a lower number of external cooperations
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the dependent variable - the number of cooperations within a tech-
region - is a count variable, we specify a negative binomial regression (NB)
to estimate the inﬂuence of technological specialization and the other vari-
ables on cooperation. Throughout all regressions in this paper the test for
overdispersion speaks in favor of the NB model.8
In table 2 the results of ﬁve regressions, labelled A to E, on the total
number of cooperations in a tech-region are presented. In column A the
number of cooperations is regressed on the specialization index TRCA and
its square.9 Universities and public research laboratories might be more
cooperative since secrecy is neither important to them - in contrary - nor
wished for by the state10 and joint projects with the industry serve as a
way of ﬁnancing research. We therefore included the number of patents in
a tech-region, where at least one assignee is a public ﬁnanced organization
(UNI EV). A positive coeﬃcient would aﬃrm the above argument. Dummies
for the ﬁve sectors (SEC1-5) were also included11 to account for systematic
8The NB arises as an extension of the Poisson regression model, which is characterized
by the equality of the conditional mean and variance (deﬁned as equidispersion). The
overdispersion parameter α indicates the degree of deviance of the variance from the
mean. For the interpretation of the coeﬃcients it is helpful to note that in the NB model








The coeﬃcient βj equals the proportionate change in the conditional mean if the jth
regressor changes by one unit. For example, if ˆ βj = 0.2 and exp(x0
iˆ β) = 2.5, then a
one-unit change in the jth regressor increases the expectation of yi by 0.5 units. For a
detailed discussion of count data regressions see Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
9Cubic terms did not prove to be signiﬁcant.
10Except perhaps defense related R&D and alike.
11Coeﬃcients for the sectoral dummies are not reported since it is not the focus of this
paper.
15diﬀerences between technologies. In this regression the coeﬃcients of TRCA
and TRCA2 are signiﬁcant and show the expected signs, so that hypothesis 1
cannot be rejected.
Table 2: Negative binomial regressions of the number of coopera-
tions in patenting on regional and technological characteristics over
all sectors
Model
A B C D E
TRCA 0.2324 0.0682 0.0931 0.0630 0.0927
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
TRCA2 −0.0030 −0.0010 −0.0011 −0.0009 −0.0011
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UNI EV 0.0585 0.0203 0.0256 0.0209 0.0256
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT 0.0167 0.0135 0.0163 0.0134
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT2 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DI −0.0211 −0.0440 −0.0245 −0.0446
(0.2616) (0.0113) (0.1871) (0.0103)
DI2 0.0035 0.0031 0.0037 0.0032









ALPHA 1.9392 1.3365 0.9528 1.3014 0.9518
LR-Index 0.0310 0.0805 0.1269 0.0833 0.1270
N = 14867; Five Sector-dummies are included; p-values in parentheses
In regression B of table 2 two new variables with the respective squared
terms are included. The absolute number of patents (PAT and PAT2) is
16included to control for diﬀerences in size between the tech-regions. Since this
measure also approximates the know-how level of a tech-region the argument
regarding the expected coeﬃcients is the same as for the specialization index.
The diversity index DI is included to account for diﬀerences in the technolog-
ical structure of the regions. If the technological diversity of a region leads to
cross-fertilization of the actors with diﬀerent technological background this
variable should show a positive coeﬃcient. When cooperations rather take
place between actors with the same kind of know-how (as assumed in the
theoretical discussion) this coeﬃcient should be negative. The patent terms
conﬁrm our expectations and the negative coeﬃcient of the diversity index
suggests that cooperations in patenting do not happen as much in diverse
regions as compared to specialized ones. The qualitative interpretation of
the other variables (TRCA, TRCA2, UNI EV ) remains unchanged while
values of the coeﬃcients drop to about a third of the value in model A.
In models C to E the path of our theoretical considerations is left in
favor of more explanatory power of the econometric model. The main topic
of the theoretical discussion above was the matching of cooperation partners
when there is a suﬃciently large number of possible partners, namely ﬁrms or
organizations performing research in the same technology. The concentration
of innovators within a tech-region (HERF and HERF2) is a measure of the
availability of local cooperation partners. If there is only one innovator the
possibility of - at least - internal cooperations is clearly low. If this technology
is also concentrated in one region as measured by HERFTECH the number
of cooperations will have to be zero.
The concentration of innovators (HERF) aﬀects the number of coop-
erations in a negative way and raises the likelihood-ratio index from 0.08
(model B) to 0.13 in models C and E. Inclusion of HERFTECH and
HERFTECH2 does not change the other coeﬃcients nor the LR-Index
much (models D and E). The negative coeﬃcient of HERFTECH in model
D was not expected, but since the squared term is about twice as high as the
linear one, we conclude that tech-regions belonging to a technological system
17which is concentrated in very few regions show a higher number of coopera-
tions. We will discuss this topic at more length in section 4.3. Throughout
models C - E hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected on every signiﬁcance level,
the other variables remain stable and the diversity index has a stronger and
signiﬁcant inﬂuence.
4.2 Diﬀerences between technological classes
To gain some insights about the robustness of the results achieved so far
and to check for possible diﬀerences between technological classes we con-
ducted regression D from table 2 for ﬁve main sectors respectively. The main
sectors are I - Electrical engineering, II - Instruments, III - Chemistry, phar-
maceuticals, IV - Process engineering, special equipment, and V - Mechanical
engineering, machinery. The sector speciﬁc results are presented in table 3.
By and large the coeﬃcients show the same signs as in the overall regres-
sion with few exceptions where the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant though.12
The robust ﬁnding of this section is that in all technological classes the rela-
tionship between specialization and cooperation is inverted U-shaped. Uni-
versity patenting has a positive inﬂuence on cooperative activities and local
concentration of innovators hinders cooperation. This ﬁnding again provides
evidence for the theoretical discussion in section 2. As far as diﬀerences be-
tween sectors are concerned the inverted U shows up strongest in sector II
(Instruments), while there university patenting is less important than in the
other sectors. Diversity of the region has a negative inﬂuence on cooperations
in tech-regions belonging to the sectors III (Chemistry/pharmaceuticals) and
IV (Process engineering/special equipment).
4.3 Internal vs. external cooperation
To analyze diﬀerences between tech-regions in the ways they make use of
internal (to the region) or external knowledge through their cooperations
12e.g. the diversity index DI and its square DI2 as well as HERF2 in sectors I and III.
18Table 3: Negative binomial regression of the number of coopera-
tions in patenting on regional and technological characteristics for
diﬀerent technological sectors
Sector∗
I II III IV V
C 0.2668 0.4767 0.6033 0.3739 0.1857
(0.2368) (0.0398) (0.0348) (0.1233) (0.2122)
TRCA 0.1654 0.1762 0.1547 0.1682 0.0843
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
TRCA2 −0.0052 −0.0121 −0.0057 −0.0081 −0.0008
(0.0050) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0968)
UNI EV 0.0180 0.0082 0.0322 0.0298 0.0342
(0.0046) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
PAT 0.0055 0.0144 0.0144 0.0230 0.0144
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT2 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DI −0.0138 −0.0059 −0.0960 −0.1426 0.0109
(0.7290) (0.8917) (0.0424) (0.0008) (0.6936)
DI2 0.0016 0.0017 0.0050 0.0080 0.0004
(0.3961) (0.4151) (0.0212) (0.0001) (0.7611)
HERF −2.4305 −3.8015 −2.8804 −2.8524 −3.6771
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HERF2 0.3206 1.1676 0.8368 1.0288 1.4408
(0.4270) (0.0112) (0.1128) (0.0293) (0.0000)
ALPHA 0.5507 0.5192 1.0244 0.9176 0.8585
LR-Index 0.1172 0.1703 0.1306 0.1178 0.1258
N 2340 1825 3164 2935 4603
∗ Sectors according to table 5
p-values in parentheses
19we perform the same speciﬁcations as in table 2 with internal and external
cooperations as dependent variables. While in section 4.1 we were interested
in answering the question if specialized tech-regions cooperate more than
others in general, we now want to identify the characteristics inﬂuencing
the pattern of cooperation, that is, we want to discriminate between factors
related to cooperation at all and the ones related to internal or external
cooperation.
The results presented in table 4 indicate that the number of patents has
a positive but declining inﬂuence on the number of internal as well as the
external cooperations. In both cases the specialization index (TRCA) is
positive and signiﬁcant, with the quadratic term (TRCA2) being negative
and signiﬁcant. Comparing regressions F and K, we ﬁnd that the predicted
inverted-U shape is much stronger for external cooperations than for internal
ones. This ﬁnding also holds for the other regressions while the diﬀerence
is not as strong. Hypothesis 2 of a rising share of internal cooperation with
rising specialization as compared to external ones is conﬁrmed. Tech-regions
that are highly specialized have diﬃculties ﬁnding appropriate partners else-
where while compensating this through relative more internal partnerships.
Interpreting this ﬁnding form a technological system point of view means that
in highly specialized tech-regions a large quantity of research relevant for the
technological system is performed in one tech-region and capable partners
are rather found inside this region.
The low signiﬁcance of technological diversity in the sector regressions
(table 3) can be explained when interpreting the results of table 4. Through-
out all regressions explaining internal cooperations the coeﬃcient of diversity
(DI) is positive while it is negative for external ones. This ﬁnding supports
the idea that ﬁrms will use local partnerships to broaden their knowledge
base, while deepening it through cooperations in their technological system,
thereby conﬁrming hypothesis 3.
The concentration of innovators (HERF) within the tech-region leads to










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21in geographically concentrated technologies (HERFTECH) cooperate less
externally than in dispersed technologies (model N). If it is controlled for con-
centration of innovators there is no signiﬁcant inﬂuence for this variable. The
negative inﬂuence of HERFTECH on internal cooperations is outweighed
by the quadratic term which is 4 times as high, implying a higher degree of
internal interaction in geographically concentrated technologies.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Providing an analysis of cooperative behavior in research which takes into
account ﬁndings from the innovation systems literature and acknowledges
ﬁrms diﬃculties in ﬁnding appropriate partners for such endeavors, we were
able to deduct hypotheses on research cooperations on the level of the tech-
nology region. Our empirical results imply with respect to our hypotheses
that: (i) tech-regions which are intermediately specialized show the highest
number of research cooperations, (ii) the higher a tech-regions technological
specialization the higher its share of internal cooperation compared to co-
operation with partners outside that region, and (iii) technologically more
diverse regions show more internal cooperations whereas for regions which
are less diverse we ﬁnd a higher number of external cooperation.
Besides these results we provided evidence on factors favorable to dense
local networking on the regional level: (i) specialization in relatively few
technologies, reliant on its core competencies, (ii) diversity for a broadening
of the knowledge base, (iii) public research institutions and universities, (iv)
low concentration of local innovators, and (v) ﬁelds of specialization that are
concentrated in few locations. A higher share of external linkages is found in
regions with few ﬁelds of specialization or low diversity and a higher degree
of concentration of local innovators.
To put the empirical analysis into perspective we have to admit that our
deﬁnition of the region is very ad hoc, the local system might easily consist
of more than one region according to three digit postal code. This is the case
22for e.g. Munich, Berlin, Hamburg and other large cities. On the other hand
is it also crude to assume that a city like Berlin is one innovation system.
The impact of this identiﬁcation problem in our study is on possibly too
many external cooperations. It does not inﬂuence our analysis of overall
cooperations.
The problem of the patenting practice of large patentees was already ad-
dressed. Large, diversiﬁed regions therefore get a higher share of the patents,
but since we don’t know if those patents have systematically diﬀerent char-
acteristics in terms of cooperations, we cannot assess the inﬂuence of this
problem.
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